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COMMON RITUAL KNOWLEDGE
Joshua Cockayne
How can participating in a liturgy allow us to know God? Recent path-
breaking work on the epistemology of liturgy has argued that liturgy allows 
individuals to gain ritual knowledge of God by coming to know-how to 
engage God. However, since liturgy (as it is ordinarily practiced) is a group 
act, I argue that we need to give an account to explain how a group can know 
God by engaging with liturgy. If group know-how is reducible to instances of 
individual know-how, then the existing accounts are sufficient for explaining 
a group’s knowing-how to engage God. However, I argue, there are good 
reasons to suppose that reductive accounts of group know-how fail. In this 
paper, I propose a non-reductive account of common ritual knowledge, ac-
cording to which the group knows-how to engage God in liturgy.
Introduction
One of the most powerful moments in the Church of England’s Eucharistic 
liturgy occurs as the priest reads the words of the Collect (a short prayer 
usually used after confession and before the Liturgy of the Word) over 
the congregation.1 In this moment, the congregation moves from being 
a collection of individuals, each with their own worries, concerns and 
questions, to becoming a unified community, a community that worships 
God together. This change is not unique to Anglican services, or even to 
traditions which use only formal written liturgy, either. As Stanley Hau-
erwas describes, the act of gathering “indicates that Christians are called 
from the world, from their homes, from their families, to be constituted 
into a community capable of praising God.”2 The very act of gathering 
together as a community signifies the importantly communal dimension 
of Christian worship and the change that takes place when we worship 
together. This paper seeks to take seriously the theological significance of 
1As Paul Bradshaw notes in the companion to the Church of England’s Common Worship, 
in using the collect, “the ministry of the president serves to unify the liturgy and draw the 
community into a worshipping community” (Companion to Common Worship, 114).
2Hauerwas, In Good Company, 157. This emphasis on the Church’s gathering from a 
variety of spheres of society is discussed in detail by Smith, Desiring the Kingdom, 159–166.
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the communal dimension of Christian worship and to offer a social episte-
mology of liturgy (however formal or informal it may be) in light of this.3
To give a social epistemology of liturgy, I begin by first considering 
how liturgy can allow us to know God. As Terence Cuneo has argued, 
our participation in the liturgy of the Church plays an important role in a 
Christian way of life which is “dedicated to engaging God in various ways 
by doing such things as blessing, petitioning, and thanking God.”4 As he 
goes on to suggest, engaging God in this way allows us to gain a kind of 
“ritual knowledge,” which consists in knowing-how to engage God by 
means of participating in the repeated acts of blessing, petitioning, and 
thanking God.5
As I will argue, whilst Cuneo’s position seems entirely plausible, since 
the emphasis is placed only on what an individual can know, his account 
stops short of providing a social epistemology of liturgy.6 To give a social 
epistemology of liturgy we need an account of what it is for a group to 
know-how to engage God. If group know-how is reducible to individual 
know-how, then Cuneo’s account will suffice. However, by building on 
recent work on group know-how,7 I argue that there are good reasons to 
suppose that group know-how is irreducible to individual know-how. 
Lastly, to give an account of how a church can know-how to engage God 
in liturgy, I apply Deborah P. Tollefsen and S. Orestis Palermos’s account 
of group know-how to the context of liturgy.8
Ritual Knowledge
Let us begin by considering what has already been said on the episte-
mology of liturgy. As James K. A. Smith notes, in recent years, there has 
been something of a “liturgical turn” in the philosophy of religion.9 Phi-
losophers of religion are beginning to take note of the importance of the 
practices of religion, and not just the importance of religious doctrine or 
religious belief. For instance, as Sarah Coakley suggests, liturgy can pro-
vide us with a kind of knowledge-by-acquaintance.10 Through repeated 
practices, we are able to slowly come to see the world differently and are 
able to develop relationships with God, “found in trust and sustained 
3I use “liturgy” in a broad sense to denote any scripted communal worship. 
4Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 148. 
5Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 163. 
6We can distinguish between at least two kinds of groups in reference to the Church. The 
Church as a whole is constituted by globally and historically distant gathered churches who 
are united together by the work of the Holy Spirit. Within this group, we can also describe 
the worship of a gathered church as a group action which individuals participate in. 
7Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How.”
8Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How.”
9Smith, “Review of Ritualized Faith,” 118. For a more detailed summary of the recent liter-
ature on liturgy and epistemology see Cockayne, “Philosophy and Liturgy Part 2.”
10Coakley, “Beyond Belief.” 
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by repeated acts of adoration and worship.”11 According to Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, liturgy provides a kind of object-knowledge of God through 
the repetition of certain forms of address. By taking for granted that God 
is a certain way by addressing him in worship, Wolterstorff thinks, partic-
ipants in a liturgy can come to know what God is like.12
One of the most influential of these accounts of liturgical epistemology 
is Cuneo’s account of “ritual knowledge.” Cuneo argues that one of the 
roles of liturgical worship is to provide participants with a certain kind 
of practical knowledge of how to engage God which cannot be reduced 
to propositional knowledge about God; he calls this “ritual knowledge.”13 
Just as knowing another person involves developing a “rapport” with that 
person in which we come to know-how to engage that person,14 Cuneo 
maintains that “knowing God consists in (although is not exhausted by) 
knowing how to engage God.”15 Liturgy provides an important means 
of gaining this kind of ritual knowledge. Filling this account out, Cuneo 
writes,
[L]iturgy makes available act-types of a certain range such as chanting, 
kissing, prostrating, and eating that count in the context of a liturgical per-
formance as cases of blessing, petitioning, and thanking God. . . . If this is 
correct, the liturgy provides the materials for not only engaging but also 
knowing how to engage God. Or more precisely: the liturgy provides the 
materials by which a person can acquire such knowledge and a context in 
which she can exercise or enact it . . . to the extent that one grasps and suffi-
ciently understands these ways of acting, one knows how to bless, petition, 
and thank God in their ritualized forms. One has ritual knowledge.16
On this proposal, it is not that certain bodily acts merely accompany certain 
speech-acts, but, rather, “in the context of the liturgy, kissing, prostrating, 
and eating also count as cases of engaging God by blessing, petitioning, 
and thanking God.”17
11Coakley, “Beyond Belief,” 340.
12Wolterstorff, “Knowing God Liturgically,” 14–15.
13Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 162. 
14Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 148–49. This claim is also confirmed by those discussing the phi-
losophy of personal knowledge, more generally. Bonnie M. Talbert, for instance, argues that
to know another is to know how to successfully interact with him/her over time. 
Knowing how to interact with a particular person starts with the largely ineffable 
ability to recognize him/her, which recognition comes to be associated with a more 
complex mental representation of that individual. . . . Our interactive skills are 
largely intuitive and difficult to express in propositional terms. For example, when 
I am talking to Shannon, I find that I pace my remarks differently than I do when I 
am talking to Deme. Without thinking about it I seem to adjust the pace of my con-
versation to what I somehow perceive is most suitable to the interaction. (Talbert, 
“Knowing Other People,” 196–197)
15Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 149.
16Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 163.
17Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 156. Cuneo attempts to stay relatively neutral on the disagreement 
between intellectualism (the thesis that knowledge-how can be reduced to knowledge-that) 
and anti-intellectualism (the thesis that it is not the case that all knowing-how is a species of 
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Whilst Cuneo’s account is both intuitive and insightful, as I will argue, 
it does not provide an account of what it is for a church to know-how 
to engage God, but only of what it is for an individual to know-how to 
engage God. Thus, to take seriously the communal dimension of Christian 
worship, we need to provide an account which explains a church’s 
know-how, that is, we need an account not just of ritual knowledge, but 
also of common ritual knowledge.
Common Worship
Having considered the connection between individual liturgical actions 
and individual know-how, it will now be important to consider the im-
portance of collective liturgical actions so that we can see their connection 
to the group’s know-how. In this section, I will make a number of brief 
observations about group liturgical action.
First, liturgy ordinarily requires acting together. As the twentieth-century 
Anglo-Catholic writer Evelyn Underhill puts it,
Christian worship is never a solitary undertaking. Both on its visible and 
invisible sides, it has a thoroughly social and organic character. The wor-
shipper, however lonely in appearance, comes before God as a member of a 
great family; part of the Communion of Saints, living and dead.18
Underhill later suggests that the outward forms of worship in the Church 
visible should somehow reflect the unity of the Church invisible. Thus, 
in order to provide a “here-and-now-embodiment” by which “man and 
women can transcend the apparent isolation of the soul and unite in a 
common act of worship,” Underhill suggests that the visible Church must 
participate in a number of practices which allow this kind of unity of 
action.19
Secondly, acting together requires some kind of coordination or plan. 
In the liturgy, this is provided by means of a liturgical script, but the point 
can be made more generally. As John Searle argues, there is an important 
difference between actions which are done at the same time and actions 
which are done together. Consider the following case, for instance:
Imagine that a group of people are sitting on the grass in various places in a 
park. Imagine that it suddenly starts to rain and they all get up and run to a 
common, centrally located, shelter. Each person has the intention expressed 
by the sentence “I am running to the shelter.” But for each person, we may 
suppose that his or her intention is entirely independent of the intentions 
knowing that) by giving some considerations in favour of what he describes as a ‘moderate 
view’ (Ritualized Faith, 151). As he describes this view, knowing-how is “a sequence of act 
types that an agent can perform,” such as “[p]erforming a work of music, swimming the 
crawl . . . and offer[ing] thanks to God” (Ritualized Faith, 151). 
18Underhill, Worship, 81. As Underhill stresses, the worship of the Church has both a vis-
ible and an invisible component. Both of these components are social in character. To think 
about the actions of the Church invisible would require much more careful theological work 
than there is space for. Here I focus only on the corporate actions of the Church visible.
19Underhill, Worship, 93. 
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and behavior of others. In this case, there is no collective behavior; there 
is just a sequence of individual acts that happen to converge on a common 
goal. Now imagine a case where a group of people in a park converge on a 
common point as a piece of collective behavior. Imagine that they are part of 
an outdoor ballet where the choreography calls for the entire corps de ballet to 
converge on a common point. We can even imagine that the external bodily 
movements are indistinguishable in the two cases; the people running for 
shelter make the same types of bodily movements as the ballet dancers. Ex-
ternally observed the two cases are indistinguishable, but they are clearly 
different internally.20
Whilst philosophers have disagreed on just what the nature of such inten-
tions are, they have generally agreed that there is a distinction to be made 
between individual and collective intentionality. On Searle’s own anal-
ysis, “we-intentions” are an irreducible phenomenon of acting together 
which require a kind of cooperation between individuals. In contrast to 
this, Michael Bratman thinks that a collective intention is reducible to each 
individual intending to act together, along with the belief that everyone 
else also has a similar intention.21 Nevertheless, both have in common 
that the intentions of individuals are different in cases of acting together.22 
In relation to acting together in liturgy this is especially important. As 
Wolterstorff puts this point, “scripts, in many cases, are very nearly in-
dispensable for acting together.”23 Similarly, as Underhill maintains, the 
kind of joint action involved in the worship of the Church, depends on our 
having “an agreed pattern, a liturgy; even though this pattern be of the 
simplest kind.”24
Thirdly, whilst a script is important for acting together, acting together 
also requires going beyond a script. As Wolterstorff points out, the pres-
ence of a liturgical script cannot entirely capture what it is to act together. 
For instance, he notes, “[i]f one person . . . says the creed very slowly 
and another says it very quickly, they are not saying the creed together,” 
despite the fact that both individuals are following the same script.25 The 
reason for this, Wolterstorff states, is that
the script for enacting a particular liturgy is never fully specified by a 
text, nor by a text supplemented by oral directives. Always some of the 
20John Searle, “Collective Intentions and Actions,” 403–404.
21Bratman, “Shared Agency,” 43–49.
22Both Searle’s and Bratman’s analyses have also been applied to explain acting liturgi-
cally. For instance, Cuneo suggests that Searle’s analysis of collective action can be used to 
explain the actions involved in liturgical singing (Cuneo, Ritualized Faith, 138), and Wolter-
storff suggests that reading a liturgical script together requires a kind of “interlocking” and 
“meshing” of individual intentions in the way described by Bratman (Wolterstorff, Acting 
Liturgically, 61). Just as the choreography of the corps de ballet is essential for forming the kind 
of we-intentions required for performing a ballet together, the liturgical script (or at least 
some agreed pattern of worship) is essential for being able to worship God together. 
23Wolterstorff, Acting Liturgically, 15. 
24Underhill, Worship, 99.
25Wolterstorff, Acting Liturgically, 64.
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prescriptions constituting the script are embedded within the social practice 
of that particular religious community for enacting its liturgies.26
This point is developed in more detailed by Bruce Ellis Benson, who thinks 
of following liturgy not as following some orchestral score (as Wolterstorff 
suggests),27 but, rather, as performing a piece of jazz.28 Even in the use 
of repetitive, scripted liturgy, Benson suggests that each performance is 
different from the last; he notes that “there is still a difference between one 
repetition and another, in the same way that there is a difference between 
one performance of a symphony and another.”29 As Benson explains, just 
as jazz musicians must be well prepared and “know . . . how to respond to 
the call of other improvisers,” the same must be the case for improvising 
in liturgical contexts.30 Whilst following a script is important for acting 
together, there must be some level of responsiveness to those one is acting 
alongside, as well as a responsiveness to the norms which are implicit in a 
community, but which cannot be made explicit in a liturgical script.
Finally, acting together requires uniting a set of disparate actors and 
actions. Whilst it is important that a church worships together, this does 
not mean that all ways of participating must be identical. For instance, in 
his discussion of the epistemology of the rituals described in Scripture, 
Dru Johnson writes that
not only is knowing a social process, but there is an intentional disparity 
in the performance of rites, which means that by its constitution, the Torah 
does not construct an egalitarian epistemology, where everyone has access 
to the same knowledge—a caricatured ideal of rationalism. Rather, because 
different roles in Israelite society will necessarily dispose persons to be var-
iously discerning, they must rely upon each other in order to know well.31
As Johnson highlights, one of the remarkable aspects of Hebrew ritual 
is that it is inclusive of children. This inclusivity exists not only for the 
sake of the children, but also for the sake of those who participate along-
side children and are led by children in worship.32 Moreover, we might 
think, such inclusivity extends to thinking about the liturgy of the Church 
today—as Benson observes, a worshipping community is composed of 
26Wolterstorff, Acting Liturgically, 20.
27Wolterstorff, The God We Worship, 7.
28Benson, Liturgy as a Way of Life, 41.
29Benson, Liturgy as a Way of Life, 141
30Benson, Liturgy as a Way of Life, 41.
31Johnson, Knowledge by Ritual, 246.
32In recent work, I make a similar point with reference to participating in liturgy along-
side those with Autism Spectrum Disorder. I suggest that an account of group liturgical 
action cannot be defined only with reference to neuro-typical individuals, who can interlock 
their intentions without difficulty, but it must also be inclusive of those who cannot form 
we-intentions (Cockayne, “Inclusive Worship”).
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“multiple voices,”33 which do not always provide polyphony, which often 
remain “distinct and sometimes dissonant.”34
Thus, not only is the liturgical worship of the visible Church communal, 
scripted and partially improvised, but it also brings together difference to 
be united.
From Acting Together to Knowing Together
We have now seen that liturgy can provide a means of knowing-how to 
engage God via acts of blessing, petitioning and thanking God, and we 
have also seen that liturgy can provide a means of acting together. Now, I 
turn to consider the interaction between these two points.
As Johnson outlines, since Hebrew rituals are inherently social in nature, 
the result is that “[i]n being disposed to know objects, constructs, or God 
Himself, more than one person is required.”35 Similarly, as Wolterstorff 
describes it, “liturgy is like music in that one acquires some particular 
know-how by being inducted into a social practice for the exercise of this 
know-how. There are others who possess the know-how in question; li-
turgical know-how is a shared know-how.”36 What remains to be seen, 
however, is how best to analyse the nature of this shared know-how.
In this section, I begin by considering the possibility that group 
know-how is reducible to instances of individual know-how. We might 
think that, in talking of a church’s knowing-how to engage God by blessing, 
petitioning and thanking God, we are only saying something about the 
know-how of the individual members of that church. If this reductive 
account is successful, then Cuneo’s account of ritual knowledge is easily 
extendible to cases of church know-how. However, I argue that there are 
good reasons to think that reductive accounts of group know-how are not 
successful.
First, it is important to note that the phenomenon of a group 
knowing-how to perform some action is not unique to the Church; we 
talk of an orchestra’s knowing-how to play a piece of music, a scientific 
research team knowing-how to perform experiments and a sports team 
knowing-how to win games.37 In all of these cases, it appears that it is the 
group which knows-how to perform various actions and not just the in-
dividuals—the violin player does not know-how to perform a symphony 
any more than the percussion player. Yet, the orchestra does appear to 
33Benson, Liturgy as a Way of Life, 94.
34Benson, Liturgy as a Way of Life, 94.
35Johnson, Knowledge by Ritual, 245.
36Wolterstorff, The God We Worship, 7–8. Wolterstorff introduces this discussion of shared 
know-how in The God We Worship but it is not developed into an account of group know-how. 
The closest Wolterstorff gets to discussing group know-how is in his recent work on liturgy 
in which he discusses the role of collective intentionality in acting together in liturgy (Acting 
Liturgically, 61–65). The epistemological implications of this account of collective intention-
ality in liturgy are not discussed in detail by Wolterstorff. 
37Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How,” 112. 
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know-how to perform the symphony. We often praise group performances 
and award orchestras, football teams and companies for their group per-
formances. This implies that, in some sense, the group is responsible for 
acting in a certain way.
One natural way of understanding these claims, and, thereby, one way 
of understanding a church’s know-how in corporate liturgy, is to reduce 
instances of group know-how to instances of individual-know-how, or a 
summation of individual-know-hows. Put simply, an account of group 
know-how is reducible to individual know-how if all statements con-
cerning group know-how are true in virtue of statements concerning 
individual know-how.
As I will argue in this section, a reductive approach does not appear 
promising. Whilst there is not space for a decisive refutation of the reduc-
tive approach here, I argue that attempting to reduce group know-how 
to the know-how of the individuals involved leads to a number of coun-
terintuitive consequences. Whilst it might be possible for defenders of 
reductive accounts to simply bite the bullet and accept that how we or-
dinarily talk about group know-how is mistaken, at the very least, these 
counterintuitive consequences provide the motivation for looking towards 
an alternative, non-reductive account. Let us begin, then, by considering 
two different reductive accounts of group know-how.
First, we might think that talk of group know-how is a “short-hand” 
way of referring to the addition of the know-how of each specific indi-
vidual member of a group.38 If it is possible to conceive of group-action 
as a simple addition of many individual actions, then perhaps we can 
think of group know-how as the addition of each individual instance of 
know-how. As Palermos and Tollefsen suggest, a case which seems easy 
to describe in these terms is that of a car production line, in which the 
expertise is distributed in such a way that each individual performs her 
own role, thereby allowing a car, say, a Chevrolet Corvette to be produced. 
Thus, we might think, to say that the Corvette production line knows-how 
to make Corvettes is simply to say that John the welder knows-how to 
weld, Mary the painter knows-how to paint, and so on. On the additive 
view, group know-how is identical with the summation of the know-how 
of each specific member.39
However, in explaining what the Corvette production line knows by 
referring only to an addition of the know-how of the individuals working 
on this production line, we must admit that strictly speaking, “no one 
knows-how to make a Corvette. Each individual in the company knows 
their own domain but no person knows-how to do all the various things 
that comprise making the Corvette . . . Corvettes are made but apparently 
38Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How,” 114–115.
39As Palermos and Tollefsen formalize the additive definition of group know-how:
‘A(KH) + B (KH) + C (KH) … = G–KH’ (“Group Know-How,” 116).
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no one knows-how to make them.”40 Additionally, although typically 
credit is given to Chevrolet for the quality of their car production, on 
an additive approach, “no one should be given credit because no one 
knows-how to make a Corvette.”41 Even if we focus on individuals with 
the most expertise in such a process, say, the production manager, or the 
original designer of the car, it is highly unlikely that these individuals 
know-how to make the car since they do not actually make the car them-
selves, at least not entirely. Moreover, focusing on the addition of specific 
individuals also appears to run into further issues. For instance, if group 
know-how is a summation of specific group members’ know-how, then we 
would have to admit that “when Catherine takes a job at Honda, Corvette 
no longer knows-how to make cars.”42 Thus, a straightforward additive 
reduction appears problematic.
Secondly, then, if we want to make sense of the production line’s 
know-how whilst avoiding these counterintuitive consequences, we might 
consider a less specific account, which attributes group know-how to gen-
eral roles rather than specific individuals. For instance, rather than think of 
the production line’s group know-how as identical to John’s knowing-how 
to weld and Mary’s knowing-how to paint, we might think that the pro-
duction line’s know-how is identical with some individual’s knowing-how 
to weld and some individual’s knowing-how to paint.43 What is important 
for the production line is not Catherine or Mary or John, but, rather, the 
roles that each of these individuals play in the production of the Corvette. 
Thus, on this view “Corvette knows-how to make a car whenever there is 
some person in the various positions that knows-how to do their job.”44
Whilst this view appears more promising, it also runs into problems. 
On this account, when Chevrolet has a position open or loses an em-
ployee, they no longer know-how to make Corvettes. This might seem like 
an obvious conclusion for some—if the machinery is running, all other 
employees are present and willing to work, it still appears that the produc-
tion line is no longer able to make Corvettes, so we should think that some 
know-how has gone missing and that the production line ceases to have 
know-how.45 However, this conclusion runs counter to how know-how 
is usually thought of. When a person breaks her leg, she does not lose 
the ability to run, and when we are asleep we do not lose our knowl-
edge of how to ride bikes—know-how appears to be something we retain 
even when we momentarily lack the capacity to engage in the relevant 
40Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How,” 115.
41Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How,” 115.
42Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How,” 116.
43As they formalise this second position: ‘p(KH) + q(KH) + r (KH) … = G(KH) … where p, 
q, r … represent some individual rather than any specific individual’ (“Group Know-How,” 
116). 
44Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How,” 116. 
45With thanks to the editor for articulating this objection so clearly.
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activities. Whilst it is clearly possible to lose one’s know-how in certain 
cases, momentarily being unable to ride a bike or to run does not mean 
that one ceases to know-how to do these things. Analogously, Palermos 
and Tollefsen suggest, “surely we would want to say that Corvette still 
knows-how to make its famous cars, just as we would want to say that 
someone with a broken leg still knows how to ride a bike.”46 Whilst it is 
surely possible for Chevrolet to cease knowing-how to produce Corvettes 
(we might say, for instance, “They just don’t know how to make cars like 
they used to” after a period of sustained poor quality production), losing 
this know-how as a result of momentarily having a vacancy would seem 
to be a strange conclusion to draw for it would imply that Chevrolet has to 
relearn how to make cars each time they gain a new employee. Yet on the 
reductive account of group know-how outlined above, group know-how 
is identical with the addition of the know-how of some individuals who 
fill various roles within the production line—so if we wish to say Chev-
rolet still knows-how to make Corvettes when it has vacancies, we should 
look elsewhere than some addition of its members’ know-how.
Whilst the move from a reductive account which focuses on specific 
individuals to one which is presented more generally avoids us having to 
say that the group’s know-how depends on some individual’s know-how, 
it does appear to require that these roles are always filled for the group to 
retain its know-how. On this position know-how appears to be lost very 
easily in a way which does not appear to be the case in individual cases 
of know-how.
At this point, the defender of the reductive account might simply 
bite the bullet and admit that companies and production lines lose and 
gain know-how much more easily than individuals. Whilst it is beyond 
the scope of this paper to decisively reject all versions of the reductive 
account of group know-how, it seems reasonable to think that the intu-
itions driving the objections above are enough to motivate an alternative 
position. Moreover, although intuitions might vary on whether Corvette 
retains its know-how when it has vacancies, and there may be ways of 
rescuing the reductive account from these counter-examples, there are 
more general problems with thinking about group know-how in additive 
terms. As Palermos and Tollefsen note, whilst a straightforward addition 
of individual know-how seems to capture something plausible about the 
way in which group know-how functions on a production line, it appears 
less plausible in cases where continuous interaction between group mem-
bers takes place. For instance, in reflecting on the example of an American 
football team’s acting together, they note that,
Players on offense need to know-how to do each of their particular jobs but 
each of those jobs requires an ongoing interaction with others in the team. 
The play is not a result of adding up discrete individual actions or individu-
al know-how regarding these actions. . . . Rather, the play itself is constituted 
46Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How,” 116. 
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by the complex interactions of individuals on the team. The performance of 
a symphony is similar in this respect. I may perform my musical instrument 
very skilfully but the skilled performance of the New York Philharmonic re-
quires more than my skilful contribution. My contribution needs to be inte-
grated with others’ contributions in a way that produces a collective skilled 
performance. This type of performance seems to emerge from the complex 
interactions of individual members, rendering . . . [group know-how] irre-
ducibly collective.47
Even if we add up what each individual knows-how to do in the context of 
group action, we have yet to give an account of group know-how; we need 
to explain how this know-how is integrated and combined to produce 
group action. The point appears to be that whilst individual know-how is 
clearly necessary for a group’s knowing-how in many cases, it is not suf-
ficient.48 We also need to say something about the function and structure 
of the group itself to make sense of attributions of know-how to it. The 
non-reductive accounts of group know-how outlined in the next section 
seek to show what else is needed for a group to know-how, above and 
beyond the know-how of each individual member.
As I described in the previous section, liturgical action is in some sense 
both scripted and improvised. That is, there is a kind of responsiveness 
and mutual awareness that must take place for a group to worship God 
together. The way in which individual intentions intertwine and mesh in 
such situations is complex. If we want to retain the idea that a church 
knows-how to engage God, then we should look beyond reductive ac-
counts of group know-how. In the next section, I consider two such 
accounts.
Group Know-how without Reduction
In this section, I outline two ways of thinking about group know-how 
which are non-reductive, before applying these to the context of liturgical 
worship. In the next section, I will suggest that both of these two accounts 
capture something of what it is for a church to know-how to engage God, 
and so the two accounts should be combined to give an account of common 
ritual knowledge. To recap: to say that group know-how is non-reductive 
is simply to say that it cannot be explained entirely with reference to the 
know-how of each individual member of the group.
First, I will outline an intellectualist account of group know-how. On 
this account, we can avoid giving a reductive account of group know-how 
47Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How,” 117. 
48As Palermos and Tollefsen highlight, the irreducibility of group know-how is also at-
tested to by work in cognitive science. For instance, Cooke et al. note,
The term “cognition” used in the team context refers to cognitive processes or 
activities that occur at a team level. Like the cognitive processes of individuals, 
the cognitive processes of teams include learning, planning, reasoning, decision 
making, problem solving, remembering, designing, and assessing situations. . . . 
Teams are cognitive (dynamical) systems in which cognition emerges through 
interactions. (“Interactive Team Cognition,” 256)
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by invoking some proposition, known by the group, which enables the 
group to perform together. As such, the group’s knowing-how is not re-
ducible only to what we can say about the know-how of each individual 
group member—it also requires that the group knows some proposition 
which provides a way of acting together. On such a proposal, as Palermos 
and Tollefsen describe it, “[t]he individual members of the group may 
know-how to perform their part, but their individual know-how depends 
on and is guided by there being a jointly accepted overall way, W, which 
is the way to perform the overall act of φ.”49
To see how this might be the case, let us consider an account of group 
propositional knowledge. On Raimo Tuomela’s account, for instance, for 
a group to believe some proposition is for the operative members (i.e., 
those in a position to make decisions on behalf of the group, such as CEOs, 
managers and leadership teams) of that group to accept some proposition 
as true, and for the non-operative members of the group to accept and to 
be aware of the group’s belief. Tuomela’s account of belief is formalised as 
follows:
(Belief of Group) G believes that p in the social and normative circumstances 
C if and only if in C there are operative members A1 … Am in G with respec-
tive positions P1 … Pm such that
(1) the agents A1 … Am, when they are performing their social tasks in their 
positions P1 … Pm, and due to their exercising the relevant authority sys-
tem of G, (intentionally) jointly accept that p, and because of this exer-
cise of authority system, they ought to continue to accept or positionally 
believe it;
(2) there is a mutual belief among the operative members to the effect that 
(1);
(3) because of (1) the (full-fledged and adequately informed) non-operative 
members of G tend tacitly to accept—or at least ought to accept—p as 
members of G; and
(4) there is a mutual belief in G to the effect that (3).50
The group’s justification for this belief, on Tuomela’s account, depends 
on the members having reasons to accept the belief as the belief of the 
group.51 Thus, if the group believes W, and is justified in believing W, then 
the group knows that W. Note that this analysis of group knowledge re-
quires a proposition to be common knowledge amongst the group. Thus, 
it is not sufficient for a group of individuals to happen to all know some 
proposition at the same time, or even for each individual to accept this 
proposition as the belief of the group. It is also necessary for the group to 
49Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How,” 118–119.
50Tuomela, “Group Belief,” 295.
51Tuomela, “Group Knowledge Analyzed.” Alternatively, one might describe group jus-
tification in reliabilist terms (see Tollefsen, “Challenging Epistemic Individualism”; Alvin 
Goldman, “Social Process Reliabilism”).
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be aware that this proposition is accepted as the belief of the group by the 
other members.
Assuming that this analysis of a group’s knowing a proposition (or some 
other account) is plausible, we can see one way of giving a non-reductive 
account of group know-how. On such an account, the members of an 
orchestra must jointly accept some proposition, W, which provides a 
way of performing some group action. For instance, what is needed for 
a group to know-how to perform Beethoven’s Ninth is for each member 
of the orchestra to know-how to perform her own instrument and for the 
group to accept some proposition, W, which provides a way to perform 
Beethoven’s Ninth. Whilst this proposal is reductive on the propositional 
nature of know-how, it is non-reductive on the question of who the agent 
of such knowledge is—the group is the subject that knows of W, that it is 
the way to perform Beethoven’s Ninth, and, in virtue of this, the group 
knows-how to perform that symphony.52 Note that on such an analysis, 
what one individually knows is partly dependent on the role one plays in 
the group. On Tuomela’s account of group belief, not everyone (or in some 
cases no one) in the group personally believes p, but, rather, the operative 
members determine the group’s belief, and the non-operative members 
need only to accept this belief as the belief of the group. Thus, the account 
appears helpful in capturing cases in which there is a variety of ways of 
contributing to the group’s action. As long as an individual at least tacitly 
accepts some way of acting, she can contribute to the group’s know-how, 
regardless of her personal beliefs and personal contribution.
Note, however, that the intellectualist account of group know-how de-
pends on there being some agreed way of performing which the group 
knows propositionally since for the group to know that p, p must be 
common knowledge to the group’s members. That is, not only must the 
violinist know that p, and the cellist know that p, but also the violinist 
must know that the cellist knows that p and that the cellist knows that the 
violinist knows that p (and so on). This rules out the possibility of using 
the intellectualist analysis to capture certain cases of group performance, 
since it requires there to be some kind of agreement in place prior to acting. 
Thus, certain kinds of improvised performance or group actions where 
there is no prior agreement between individuals are difficult to capture 
in intellectualist terms.53 This is not to say anything about the limitations 
of reducing all instances of know-how to know-that. In the case of indi-
vidual know-how, the intellectualist will surely insist that all instances 
of know-how, regardless of how complex or how difficult to describe in 
propositional terms, can be reducible to instances of knowledge-that.54 The 
same cannot be said for group know-how, however. The reason for this is 
that, for some proposition to be known by a group, the proposition has to 
52Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How,” 118. 
53Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How,” 120.
54Thanks to the editor for suggesting this objection. 
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be common knowledge to the members of the group and accepted as the 
group’s belief by the relevant operative and non-operative members. This 
requires there to be prior understanding of a proposition before the group 
acts. Thus, in the case of improvised or spontaneous performance, whilst 
it might be possible for each individual’s know-how to be summarized 
propositionally (if intellectualism is true), it is not clear how the group’s 
know-how could be known propositionally since there is no prior agree-
ment between individuals that they will act in a certain way. The fact that 
some group performance does not fit the intellectualist account well (and 
as we will see in the next section, some aspects of group liturgical action 
seem difficult to capture on the intellectualist account) provides some mo-
tivation for looking to non-intellectualist accounts of group know-how.
Secondly, then, it is possible to give an account of group know-how 
which does not reduce know-how to propositional knowledge. I will 
refer to this account as the “non-intellectualist account.” On this account, 
“know-how is a form of disposition or ability, that belongs to an intelligent 
agent, because, when manifested, not only can it be well regulated, but 
also performed in a responsible manner.”55 Thus, assuming know-how is 
not always reducible to know-that, we must provide an account of how 
groups could be considered intelligent agents which have dispositions to 
act in a certain way. Note again that whilst individuals within the group 
are required to have certain kinds of know-how, what is required in addi-
tion to this is something about the group (a disposition to act in a certain 
way in certain circumstances).
As with the literature on group belief, the literature on group agency 
is considerable.56 Many of the positions developed in this literature seek 
to give an account of how groups, constituted by individual members, 
could be considered agents in their own right. Often, this requires taking 
a certain functionalist stance on what it is to be an agent. For instance, as 
Peter French describes it, agents must display a level of rationality (i.e., 
they must have a reason for acting), and they must be able to respond to 
feedback and adjust their actions accordingly.57 Similarly, Christian List 
and Philip Pettit suggest that an agent must have “representational states, 
motivational states, and a capacity to act on their basis.”58 By examining 
the decisionmaking processes of groups, whether that be through some 
55Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How,” 120. Note (as an anonymous referee help-
fully pointed out) that this view of know-how also implies a kind of virtue epistemology in 
which epistemic agents (and thus groups) can be praised or blamed. This appears to have 
interesting implications for a view of worship—on this view congregations can worship God 
well or poorly and some churches appear to be more or less virtuous. This conclusion seems 
to be compatible with the way worship is described in Scripture in many places. For instance, 
in Amos 5, God condemns the worship and festivals of the people of Israel because they fail 
to pursue justice. This topic is deserving a more detailed exploration and there is not space 
to explore the moral implications of this position here. 
56Tollefsen summarizes much of this literature in Groups as Agents.
57French, Corporate Ethics, 10–12.
58List and Pettit, Group Agency, 20. 
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hierarchical structure, a dictatorship, or an egalitarian voting process, 
both French, and List and Pettit suggest that groups can meet the con-
ditions for agency. Thus, if groups can be considered intelligent agents 
capable of performing certain actions, we ought to consider them capable 
of knowing-how to perform these actions.
Yet, whilst such accounts might provide some explanation of how 
groups can be considered agents, as Tollefsen argues elsewhere, what 
is lacking from such accounts is an explanation of how groups could be 
regarded as having mental states and engaging in cognitive processes.59 
Palermos and Tollefsen attempt to provide such an account by appealing 
to the literature on distributed cognition. As they explain,
In order to claim that two (or more) systems give rise to some distributed 
process and, thereby, to an overall distributed system . . . we need to estab-
lish that the contributing parts are non-linearly related to each other on the 
basis of continuous reciprocal interactions between them. . . . in order to have 
an overall distributed cognitive system—as opposed to merely several indi-
vidual cognitive systems that are socially embedded . . . the requirement is 
that the contributing members . . . collaboratively perform a cognitive task 
by interacting continuously and reciprocally with each other.60
Put simply, an account of distributed cognition is required when the in-
teractions between group members cannot be straightforwardly divided 
into individual cognition. For instance, as we saw previously, an orches-
tra’s performing of a symphony is not merely a case of violin players 
knowing-how to read the violin score and percussionists knowing-how 
to read the percussion score—there must be a level of interaction and re-
sponsiveness to one another’s performance. On Palermos and Tollefsen’s 
account, this kind of distributed cognitive system requires that “the 
contributing members (i.e., the relevant cognitive agents) collaboratively 
perform a cognitive task by interacting continuously and reciprocally 
with each other.”61
It is important to note that not all behaviour which might potentially 
be identified as cognitive in this way will meet the conditions for group 
action. For instance, a random group of individuals might all individually 
be proficient at playing jazz instruments, and happen, momentarily, to 
play a piece of jazz music harmoniously.62 While such an example might 
appear to be a case of group know-how, the reason that it should not be 
considered as such, Palermos and Tollefsen suggest, is that “[t]he rele-
vant behaviour needs to instead rise out of the cooperative and (thereby) 
self-regulatory activity of some appropriate collection of units that will 
allow it to be (at least potentially) regular behaviour.”63 Thus, they think, 
59Tollefsen, Groups as Agents, 64–65. 
60Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How,” 121.
61Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How,” 121.
62Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How,” 123–124.
63Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How,” 122.
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“in order for them to qualify as a jazz band, they must regularly be in tune 
and in synch, and for that to be the case, every player’s performance must 
be continuously interdependent to everyone else’s.”64
If groups are organised in the relevant way, it is possible that group 
know-how might emerge. In contrast to a kind of reductive additive 
account of group know-how, then, the non-reductive non-intellectualist 
account holds that group know-how is an emergent property of groups 
which have a certain functional role. On this account, group know-how 
emerges,
[w]hen individual members coordinate on the basis of reciprocal interactions, 
they adapt mutually to each other by restricting their actions in such a way 
so as to reliably—that is, regularly—achieve ends that they would only luck-
ily—if ever—bring about were they to act on their own. Via the application 
of such positive mutual constrains, which result from, and further guide, 
the members’ coordinated activity, new collective properties (i.e., regular 
behaviors) emerge and the collective achieves a stable configuration that is 
necessary for successful operation.65
Thus, just as the intellectualist account depends on providing some 
plausible account of group knowledge, the non-intellectualist account 
depends on providing some plausible account of distributed cognition. 
Whilst filling out both of these positions is not within the scope of this 
paper, the bare bones of both accounts should be sufficient to see how an 
account of common ritual knowledge might develop.
Common Ritual Knowledge
We are now in a position to consider an account of group know-how 
which can help fill out an account of common ritual knowledge.
As we have seen, there are reasons to suppose that liturgical worship 
requires group actions for which there is a diversity of participants and 
ways of participating. Furthermore, we have also seen that we should re-
gard the community as the agent of the action of engaging God, and not 
just the individual participants. Thus, if group know-how is truly non-re-
ductive, then we must look to explain the nature of acting liturgically with 
reference to a non-reductive account of group know-how. Let us consider 
the possibility of such an application with reference to the two accounts 
outlined above.
First, the application of an intellectualist account of group know-how, 
according to which a group accepts some proposition as a way of acting, 
has some promise in the context of liturgy. As Wolterstorff highlights, 
the presence of a script in the context of group action allows for the 
possibility of correct or incorrect performance of some group action, by 
reference to how well a script is followed.66 In part, Wolterstorff notes, 
64Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How,” 122.
65Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How,” 122.
66Wolterstorff, Acting Liturgically, 15. 
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performing some group action correctly is a matter of suspending acting 
on one’s own judgement “as to what would be good to do and instead 
follow the script.”67 He continues, “[w]e are all, in fact, rule-submissive and 
script-submissive selves; nobody is a purely autonomous self. We all act 
heteronomously.”68
The kind of correctness rules which Wolterstorff refers to here can be 
captured well by thinking of a church’s group know-how as a mutually 
accepted way of acting. In the context of a sports team’s acting, for in-
stance, this account appears to capture much of what it is to act together. 
To be committed to a certain team with certain values is a commitment 
to a certain way of playing. Playing for Manchester United, for instance, 
might bring with it a commitment to playing attacking, fast-paced football 
(although perhaps less so in recent seasons). Furthermore, following the 
instructions of a coach in performing some maneuver on the pitch might 
also be captured by commitment to a joint way of playing—for instance, 
Jose Mourinho might specify that a free kick is to be taken in a certain way, 
outlining the roles of each particular player. Performing this maneuver 
correctly requires successfully adhering to Mourinho’s instructions. More 
generally, as Palermos and Tollefsen describe, “team members need to be 
explicitly committed to act as parts of the team, such that their behaviour 
will mesh with the actions of the other members.”69
It is easy to see how this account might be extended to think about 
acting together in following a liturgical script—in belonging to a church 
or a particular tradition, we are committing to some particular way of 
performing liturgy and thereby to some particular way of engaging God. 
Moreover, as we have seen, commitment to worshipping together does 
appear to require some explicit commitment to acting as part of a group. 
The use of plural pronouns in a liturgical script (e.g., “We believe in God 
the Father . . . ” is used in the recitation of the creed) is one example of 
how the script reinforces our commitment to acting together in liturgy.70 
Thus, assuming Tuomela’s (or some other plausible alternative) can cap-
ture a church’s knowledge of a proposition, then this account can provide 
some explanation of what it is for a church to know-how to engage God 
in worship.
If all that took place in group liturgical actions were following a script, 
then the intellectualist account might suffice for an account of common 
67Wolterstorff, Acting Liturgically, 15. 
68Wolterstorff, Acting Liturgically, 16. 
69Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How,” 126. 
70As an anonymous referee helpfully points out, liturgy also uses singular first-person 
pronouns, such as in the Apostles’ Creed (“I believe in God the Father . . . ”). This highlights 
the point that Christian liturgy does put emphasis on the individual’s response to God and 
her engaging God in liturgy, as well as having a corporate emphasis. This need not un-
dermine anything I have argued for in this paper, however, and Cuneo’s and Wolterstorff’s 
recent work gives a detailed overview of the philosophical implications of this individual 
emphasis.
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ritual knowledge. But it is not all that takes place. As we have seen, 
there are some actions which can’t be specified by the script, and a level 
of liturgical improvisation and mutual responsiveness which is crucial 
to acting together. Palermos and Tollefsen suggest that in the context of 
acting together in a sports team, for instance, whilst there may be some 
joint commitment to a way of playing which can be captured by a shared 
commitment to a way of performing, this cannot capture all that the group 
knows-how to do. They note that,
a number of studies also indicate that certain forms of joint action and . . . 
[group know-how], such as interpersonal rhythmic coordination, can spon-
taneously emerge on the basis of dynamical process interaction—without 
the further need, on the part of the individual members to take up any in-
tellectualist commitments. . . . [Intellectualist commitments] prevent the 
behaviour of the individual members of the team from deviating from the 
individual behaviour that is required for the team to coordinate—or, per-
haps somewhat more weakly, intellectualist commitments disallow team 
members to engage in behaviour that would prevent the team from acting 
in a sufficient coordinated manner.71
Their point, put simply, is that not all group actions require commitment 
to a way of playing. Some group-level behavior emerges through repeated 
performance without prior agreement. Yet, as we have seen the intellec-
tualist account depends on there being prior agreement to some way of 
acting. Moreover, even in cases in which such commitment already exists 
(such as in sports teams), intellectualist commitments appear to function 
as necessary requirements for group action, but not sufficient require-
ments. There is more to following Mourinho’s plan for enacting some new 
maneuver in taking a free-kick than remembering all of the relevant in-
structions, and there is more to performing an orchestral symphony than 
correctly reading one’s own part of the score and knowing that the group 
is committed to playing the symphony in a certain way. Such commit-
ments might provide helpful parameters to the group’s performance in 
these two cases, but what is required for correctly performing both actions 
is a mutual awareness of the relevant group members and an ability to 
self-correct when things go wrong.
In the context of liturgy, the script can provide the correctness rules for 
performing a certain liturgy, and a certain way of engaging God. Yet, if 
there is some element of going beyond the script or improvising from the 
script, then the intellectualist account won’t be sufficient for providing an 
account of common ritual knowledge. The intellectualist account might 
provide the necessary conditions for acting together, but it cannot pro-
vide the sufficient conditions. Thus, there is need to give an account of 
the group cognition which arises from the complex engagement between 
church members in liturgy, which cannot be reduced to a propositional 
way of acting.
71Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How,” 126–127.
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In earlier work I have suggested that in thinking of the church’s ac-
tions in worship, we should appeal not only to the collective intentions of 
church members, but also to how they might act as a group agent. Building 
on the account of agency developed by List and Pettit (summarized in the 
previous section), I noted that
the organizational structure of a church will depend, in part, on one’s tra-
dition, but it seems clear that a member of a church, by participating in 
the reading of liturgical scripts and singing hymns can act on behalf of the 
group in a manner analogous to a member of a trade union acting on behalf 
of a group by standing on a picket line. Note that these kinds of actions 
might be performed through acts of . . . [collective intentionality], such as the 
singing of the liturgical script, but we might also include many other actions 
as instances of playing an active role in a group. Just as organizations need 
both sub-committees and expert individuals to contribute to the actions of 
the group, the individual actions of neuro-atypical individuals could rightly 
be considered as playing an active role in the actions of the group.72
I then develop this account to suggest that, as long as one is licensed ap-
propriately by the operative members of the group, one could contribute 
to the church’s actions in a number of different ways. For instance, “in 
the case of an individual with ASD who experiences a heightened spir-
itual awareness, such an individual might in turn lead other individuals 
in the congregation to a heightened awareness of the presence of God, 
and thereby, in turn, contribute to the collective actions of the group.”73 
Thinking of the church as an agent which is capable of acting is helpful for 
thinking about how the church might know-how to engage God.
Moving beyond an account of church agency, to thinking about a 
church’s distributed cognition, we must suppose that in performing some 
liturgical script, members coordinate their actions and mutually adapt to 
one another’s actions to reliably produce ends. This kind of interaction is 
not merely a matter of following instruction, but it also requires a kind of 
responsiveness to how the other members of the congregation follow this 
instruction. Thinking about the question of self-regulation will be helpful 
here. In the case of a jazz band performing, for instance, “the drummer 
could give visual or even verbal hints to the trombonist that he’s lost his 
concentration and that he fails to follow the band’s rhythm, despite her 
best attempts to ‘bring her back’.”74 In such a situation, so long as the 
drummer is brought back into the rhythm of the band, the interactivity be-
tween the trombonist and the drummer allows the group to self-regulate 
in such a way that it performs the piece correctly.
This kind of interactivity must take place within a church community 
too. An excellent example of how this interactivity and self-correction 
might take place (against the backdrop of a scripted way of performing) 
72Cockayne, “Inclusive Worship,” 469.
73Cockayne, “Inclusive Worship,” 473. 
74Palermos and Tollefsen, “Group Know-How,” 124.
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can be found in Benson’s description of his visit to Saint Gregory of Nyssa 
Episcopal Church in San Francisco:
the service begins . . . with a prayer, some announcements, and yet another 
welcome to everyone. Then the cantor . . . casually explains how the service 
will go. He sings the melody of the first piece of music . . . giving the congre-
gation a brief chance to practice and become comfortable with the music. . . . 
Although there is a choir, the choir members are interspersed throughout 
the congregation—which means that wherever you’re standing, nearby is a 
good singer whom you can count on for help . . . after the service . . . those in-
volved in the service disappear to spend five minutes discussing what went 
well in the service and what could be improved . . . one remarkable thing 
about the worship at Saint Gregory’s is that it feels so spontaneous. And yet 
it is actually highly scripted. In other words, it achieves what less liturgical 
churches often hope to achieve—a sense of openness, spontaneity, and lack 
of formality, and the sense that the Holy Spirit is alive in guiding the wor-
ship. But it does so by very closely following a script, one that gets modified 
on the basis of . . . short meetings after each service.75
As Benson highlights here, St Gregory’s engagement with God is both 
scripted and spontaneous. They are committed to a way of acting and 
engaging God which is made possible both by a written script, as well as 
by the instructions of the cantor. But they are also involved in a complex, 
higher-level group action in which members of the group are constantly 
interacting with one another, allowing the group to self-regulate their ac-
tions in liturgy. This is achieved by strategic placement of the choir, which 
helps the group to self-correct when members of the group veer from the 
pitch of the group, but also by the reflection on the content and perfor-
mance of the script in the short after service meetings. If Palermos and 
Tollefsen are right, then the know-how that emerges in a context like this 
is not reducible to what each individual knows, but it is only analyzable 
by looking at the group’s performance.
Indeed, that acting together in liturgy requires more than a commitment 
to a way of acting, can be observed by noting that worshipping as part of a 
community is something which is acquired by repeated engagement and 
not just by grasping some theoretical fact. As Smith puts this point, there 
is a kind of irreducible “logic of practice” involved in being part of a ritual 
community, which resists propositional reduction.76 He suggests that
natives—that is, practitioners, “unselfconsciously” embedded in a commu-
nity of practice—are not primarily theorists. They are not “thinking” their 
way through the world; they are not reflecting on what they’re doing—
which is precisely why any adequate interpretation of what’s going on in 
such a community of practice will need to resist the temptation to construe 
practitioners as implicit theorizers.77
75Bruce Benson, Liturgy as a Way of Life, 135–140.
76Smith, Imagining the Kingdom, 76–79.
77Smith, Imagining the Kingdom, 77.
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This seems right. Belonging to a liturgical community is something which 
takes time and repeated practice. One way of describing why this is the 
case is in reference to the kind of improvisation that takes place in liturgical 
worship—as we have seen, performing a liturgy is not simply reciting a 
script. In learning how to belong and act in such a community, one is also 
learning to contribute to the group as an agent.
As Palermos and Tollefsen admit, many cases of group action will in-
volve both a kind of intellectualist group know-how in which a group 
accepts a proposition, and a kind of non-intellectualist group know-how 
in which participation in a complex group interaction gives rise to emer-
gent cognitive states. As we have seen, whilst a sports team’s commitment 
to a certain way of playing might account, to some extent, for the group 
know-how of the sports team, it cannot account for all aspects of the 
group’s performance. Similarly, I have suggested, whilst a commitment 
to a certain way of acting liturgically might partially capture what it is 
for a church to know-how to engage God, it cannot capture this entirely. 
What is required is an account of how individuals coordinate and interact 
in such a way that the group functions as an agent, and thereby group 
know-how emerges in the complex interactions of the group members. A 
helpful way to summarize how these two accounts might interact can be 
found in Underhill’s discussion of the tensions of “habit” and “attention” 
in Christian worship:
Habit and attention must therefore co-operate in the life of worship; and it 
is a function of cultus to maintain this vital partnership. Habit alone easi-
ly deteriorates into mechanical repetition, the besetting sin of the liturgical 
mind. Attention alone means, in the end, intolerable strain. Each partner has 
his weak point. Habit tends to routine and spiritual red-tape; the vice of the 
institutionalist. Attention is apt to care for nothing but the experience of the 
moment, and ignore the need of a stable practice, independent of personal 
fluctuations; the vice of the individualist. Habit is a ritualist. Attention is a 
pietist. But it is the beautiful combination of order and spontaneity, docili-
ty and freedom, living humbly—and therefore fully and freely—within the 
agreed pattern of the cultus and not in defiance of it, which is the mark of a 
genuine spiritual maturity and indeed the fine flower of a worshipping life.78
Conclusion
If ritual knowledge is acquired by means of an individual’s engaging God 
by blessing, thanking and petitioning God, then common ritual knowledge 
is acquired by means of a church’s engaging God by blessing, thanking 
and petitioning God. To perform these liturgical actions together, we must 
follow a script closely, but yet remain aware of the other members of the 
community. If we wish to claim (as Wolterstorff does) that “[t]he church 
blesses God, praises God, thanks God. . . . It’s not the individual members 
who do these things simultaneously; it’s the assembled body that does 
78Underhill, Worship, 27–28.
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these things,”79 then we need some account not only of ritual knowledge 
but also of common ritual knowledge. If we are reductive about group 
know-how, then it cannot be true that the church knows-how to worship 
God but, rather, we have to admit, each individual member knows-how 
to engage God, and together these acts constitute a church’s worship. 
Such a reduction looks problematic for both theological and philosophical 
reasons. Thus, as I have suggested, we should look to a non-reductive 
account of group know-how.
On this account, the church knows-how to act by means of (i) its group 
knowledge of some proposition which summarizes some way of acting 
together in the liturgy, and (ii) its acting together to form a group agent 
capable of emergent cognitive states and a disposition to engage God. 
Acting together in this second way requires mutual awareness, as well as 
an ability for the group to self-correct when its actions go wrong.
There is clearly much more work to be done both in social epistemology 
and on the philosophy of liturgy. Much of what I have been exploring in 
this article pushes at the limits of what analytic theology and philosophy 
of religion has explored, and one notable area of silence from philoso-
phers and analytic theologians is that of ecclesiology. If we want to say 
that the Church engages God or that the Church knows-how to engage 
God, then to properly advance the discussion of liturgy, we must think 
more carefully about just what the Church is.80
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